Western University

Scholarship@Western
History Publications

History Department

2021

Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence Engage in
this Treasonous Act?
Marvin L. Simner
Western University, msimner@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/historypub
Part of the United States History Commons

Citation of this paper:
Simner, Marvin L., "Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence Engage in this Treasonous
Act?" (2021). History Publications. 406.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/historypub/406

Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence
Engage in this Treasonous Act?

Marvin L. Simner

Abstract
The penalty for committing an act of treason against the Crown in 1775, as read by British
judges sentencing Irish rebels, was as follows:
You are to be drawn on hurdles to the place of execution, where you are to be hanged
by the neck, but not until you are dead; for, while you are still living your bodies are to
be taken down, your bowels torn out and burned before your faces, your heads then cut
off, and your bodies divided each into four quarters, and your heads and quarters to be
then at the King’s disposal; and may the Almighty God have mercy on your souls.1
Those who signed the Declaration of Independence were well aware of the fact that, by virtue
of their signatures, they would be endorsing a treasonous act and, if caught, their punishment
would be as described above. Because of the horrendous nature of this punishment, it is not
surprising that over the years the 56 delegates who signed this document were often said to be
among the most heroic of the early patriots. The evidence to be reported, however, shows that
the events that took place prior to the issuing of the Declaration may have encouraged the
signers to voluntarily engage in this act without any fear of punishment. Some further evidence
reported below also provides a possible answer to a question raised by Meier (1997) who asked
why the delegates even bothered to sign the Declaration.
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Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence
Engage in this Treasonous Act?
Marvin L. Simner
Speaking on Independence Day, 1821, John Quincy Adams, 6th President of the Unites States
and the son of John Adams, a signer of the Declaration, stated that the Declaration of
Independence
was merely an occasional state-paper. It was a solemn exposition to the world, of the
causes which have compelled the people of a small portion of the British empire, to cast
off their allegiance and renounce the protection of the British king: and to dissolve their
social connection with the British people.2
Although at the time it may have been “merely an occasional state-paper,” in recent years the
Declaration has been referred to as a “war document”3 and, because of its message, Maier
summarized its impact in the following words: “From the viewpoint of those who opposed its
message, the Declaration was nothing less than a public confession of treason.”4 In view of the
seriousness of this public confession Brodie even provided her readers with a detailed
description of the horrendous penalty for treason (see the Abstract) which did not change until
March 17, 1813, when Parliament approved a bill to include only hanging or beheading as a
more humane form of punishment. Given the brutal nature of this early punishment, coupled
with their “pledge to each other (of) our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,” as stated in
the Declaration itself, it is certainly not surprising that the 56 delegates to the Second
Continental Congress in Philadelphia who signed the Declaration have often been considered
among the most heroic figures in American history.5 The author of an 1857 publication titled
“American’s Own Book” characterized their lives and the personal consequences of performing
this deed in the following manner.
The memories of few men will perhaps be cherished, by their posterity, with more
jealous and grateful admiration than those of the patriotic individuals, who first signed
the political independence of our country. They hazarded by the deed not only their
lands and possessions but their personal freedom and their lives, and when it is
considered that most of them were in the vigor of existence, gifted with considerable
fortune, and with all the offices and emoluments at the disposal of royalty within their
reach, the sacrifice which they risked appears magnified, and their disinterested
patriotism more worthy of remembrance.6

2

The purpose of the current undertaking was to ask if the act of signing the Declaration was
truly fraught with as much danger as has so often been suggested. To answer this question we
reviewed the timeframe and events associated with the drafting and the dissemination of each
of the three initial versions of the Declaration.

The Emergence of the Declaration of Independence
The first phase in the development of the Declaration occurred on June 7, 1776, during a
meeting of the Second Continental Congress when Richard Henry Lee from Virginia presented
the following motion on behalf of Virginia to the congressional delegates in Philadelphia.
That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states,
that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally
dissolved.7
Owing to the contentious nature of Lee’s motion it was decided that a vote on the motion
needed to be delayed until July 1 so that the delegates would have sufficient time to meet with
the colonies they represented to determine how best to deal with this matter. Because of
comments that had occurred during the course of the initial debate it was also decided that a
committee needed to be formed to draft a document that reflected the justification as well as
the significance of the motion.
On June 10 the Continental Congress appointed the following five delegates to form such a
committee: John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Richard Henry Lee, Robert Livingston and Robert
Sherman. As the result of his role in preparing the Virginia motion Lee was also asked to draft
the follow-up document requested by Congress. On June 11 Lee received word that his wife
was ill and that he needed to return to Virginia immediately. It was due to his abrupt departure
that Thomas Jefferson, a fellow delegate from Virginia, was asked to take his place and to
prepare the required draft.8
The second phase took place on June 28, 1776, when Congress met as a whole to read
Jefferson’s draft, which had been modified to some extent by several committee members.
Because it was felt that the submitted draft required still further modifications, it was decided
to postpone ratification for several days. The third phase occurred on July 2 when the final
revised draft was read and approved, but not signed. Next, Charles Thomson, Secretary of the
Continental Congress,
Ordered that the Declaration be authenticated & printed. That the committee
appointed to prepare the Declaration superintend & correct the press. That copies of
the Declaration be sent to the several assemblies, conventions & committees or councils
3

of safety and to the several commanding officers of the continental troops and that it be
proclaimed in each of the united states & at the head of the army.
This unsigned body of the Declaration was then delivered to Thomas Dunlap, a local printer in
preparation for printing. It has been estimated that around 200 paper copies of this initial
version of the Declaration were printed and circulated as required by Congress. Of this
number, 21 copies are known to exist and 17 were examined in the 1970s by Fredrick Goff. 9
Although it has been claimed by Wilfred Ritz10 that 34 of the delegates who were present on
July 2 signed the document, the only names Goff identified were those of the Congressional
Secretary, Charles Thomson, and the President of the Continental Congress, John Hancock.
Thus, if the claim by Ritz has any merit, what might have been signed was the printer’s proof
which, it is said, has never been found and may have been destroyed (see page 189 in Ritz).
While it is unknown if these 34 delegates purposely avoided signing the circulated document to
prevent being charged with treason, because of the absence of their names, it is extremely
unlikely that any would have been charged with treason.
The first formal public reading of the document took place on July 8 in Philadelphia and the first
newspaper to publish the body of the Declaration was the Pennsylvania Evening Post on July 6
followed by a German translation published in Philadelphia on July 9. On that same day George
Washington received his copy and, in compliance with the order from Congress, had it read to
his troops. According to Maier,11 Washington and Congress hoped that the material contained
in the body of the Declaration would inspire the soldiers, and “might also encourage men to
join the army and help American affairs take a more favorable turn.”
In line with this last point, it is worth noting that of the many grievances in the Declaration that
were levied against the British, with few exceptions, most began with the words “He has
refused…, He has forbidden…” By personalizing the enemy in this fashion the colonists’ anger
was clearly directed solely at the crown which would have made military recruitment far easier
than if the blame for the grievances had been placed on the largely amorphous body of the
British Parliament. In the words of Black,12 this terminology was an intentional “indictment of
a conspirator, who had misused his executive power…making George akin to an Old Testament
plague.” Indeed, it was the case that after hearing the Declaration, hatred of the king had
become so pronounced that crowds in many cities tore down and destroyed signs or statues
representing authority. For example, in New York City an equestrian statue of King George was
pulled down and the lead used to make musket balls.13 Because it was also the case that a
number of the grievances had already been resolved or never enforced,14 these may have been
included in the Declaration, at least in part, to refresh the colonists’ memories of their previous
resentments against the crown in order to further encourage enlistments.
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When understood in this way, the initial printing of the Declaration, which was circulated but
unsigned, might not have been intended as a war document, in the literal sense of a declaration
of war, but instead to serve as a military recruitment tool or call to arms in the event that a full
scale war with Britain ever became necessary. Given this possibility it is not surprising that
Maier15 was further led to conclude that the Dunlap Broadside “was designed first and
foremost for domestic consumption.”
The second version of the Declaration, which was finished on August 2, 1776, had a very
different purpose. Known as the Matlack copy, this time the Declaration was printed on
parchment and it was hoped that everyone would sign by August 2.16 With the exception of
five delegates who signed sometime later, everyone did so by this date. Because only one
copy was produced, this parchment version was not destined for widespread distribution but,
instead, was intended for later preservation in a permanent location once the war was over.
Hence, very few people outside of the members of the Continental Congress would have been
aware of this signed copy since it “traveled with the Continental Congress as it moved by land
and by water during the Revolutionary War…(possibly) rolled for transport or, just as likely,
folded to fit into a saddle bag or wooden chest.”17
The level of secrecy associated with the Matlack copy as well as the degree of anonymity that
had accompanied the Dunlap Broadside, changed with the printing of the third and final version
of the Declaration. Known as the Goddard Broadside this version was authorized by Congress
on January 18, 1777. It was printed on paper with the names of all but one of the 56 signers
(Thomas McKean), and was intended for public distribution to a much wider audience than the
Dunlap Broadside. With the release of this third version, the public for the first time became
aware of those who had endorsed the message contained in the document. Until then, outside
of the delegates themselves, no one knew who had actually been responsible for the message.
In fact, it wasn’t until 1784 that Thomas Jefferson was even identified as its author!
What is most important here in relation to the issue at hand is the date when this third version
was released to the public. By late December, 1776, early January, 1777, the Continental Army
under George Washington’s command, had gained what were extremely important military
victories in New Jersey. The battle of Trenton was won on December 26, 1776, while the
victory at Princeton was achieved on January 3, 1777. In commenting on the timing of this
release Maier18 made the following observation.
They (the signers) were not given to throwing their fate into God’s hands needlessly.
Only on January 18, 1777, after the long, disastrous military campaign of 1776 (in which
the Americans suffered major losses in the battles of Brooklyn Heights and New York
City) was over and the Americans had won victories at Trenton and Princeton, did
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Congress send the states authentic copies of the Declaration of independence with the
names of the members…subscribing the same.
Although it is unclear what Maier might have meant by the statement “throwing their fate into
God’s hand’s needlessly,” it is possible that the delegates could have considered this an
opportune moment for reaching a negotiated settlement for ending the war with Great Britain.
Given the losses the British had already suffered at Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Boston
and now at Trenton and Princeton, it could be that this third version with all of the names
attached, was released at a time when the members of the Continental Congress might have
been reasonably confident that more British losses were to be expected in the future. If the
Continental Army had been successful in achieving this goal, the Declaration with its list of
grievances could then have been used as the starting point for such negotiations. As one of the
conditions for achieving a peaceful settlement, Congress, no doubt, would have requested the
dismissal of any charges of treason that otherwise could have been levied against the signers of
this document.
There are several reasons for suggesting that this might have been the case. First, because of
the successes that had already been realized in resolving a number of the grievances (see end
note 14) it would have seemed reasonable to think that similar progress could have been
achieved in resolving the remaining grievances through an early set of talks with
representatives from Great Britain. Second, as recently as July 8, 1775, the Continental
Congress had attempted to broker an end to the impending war when it sent to the King an
appeal for reconciliation known as the Olive Branch Petition.19 Although this petition was
initially rejected, Lord Dartmouth received the King’s approval in February, 1776, to send a
commission to the colonies to negotiate reconciliation on the basis of the Olive Branch
Petition20 and word of this commission had reached the members of Congress as early as May,
1776.21 Third, Benjamin Franklin had been in discussion with two of the highest ranking British
commanders in North America, General William Howe and his brother, a Vice-Admiral in the
British navy, both of whom were strongly in favor of finding a peaceful solution to the
impending conflict. In the spring of 1776 General Howe sent a letter to London that expressed
his reservations about a British victory owing to the strength of the colonial military and had
even previously proposed several means for achieving a negotiated settlement.22 Finally, the
delegates were also aware of Franklin’s conversations with Lord Chatham, an important
member in the House of Lords who had supported a peaceful settlement with the colonists. On
February 1, 1775, Lord Chatham introduced “A provisional Act for Settling the Troubles in
America,” that was designed to “pacify America” by granting the Continental Congress “a role in
devising a new constitutional and financial settlement.”23
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In addition to this parliamentary and military support in favor of a peaceful solution to these
difficulties, it was also known that a similar level of support existed among the citizens of Great
Britain who were kept fully informed throughout this period of all the events that were taking
place in the colonies.
It is a fact of some importance that English newspapers made the colonial interpretation
of events in America accessible to the English public in precisely those terms that (the
Continental) Congress thought most convincing. In its first petition to the Crown,
Congress explicitly planned a public relations campaign in England in the hope of
eliciting public support for its actions…The English press cooperated in this effort with
surprising unanimity; even those editors who were hostile to the colonies consistently
printed the most important papers…During the Stamp Act crisis all the key trading and
industrial areas of England petitioned for repeal; a decade later, sixteen of these
twenty-five places (64%) appealed once again for conciliation…In 1775 the people of
England advised the king of England: If this plan (of war) should continue to be enforced,
it must be attended with a great waste of blood and treasure to this country, without
any well-grounded prospect of success, and may finally deprive these kingdoms of the
valuable trade of America, and force the inhabitants of that country, against their
inclination and interest, to set up an independent state.24
Unfortunately for the Congressional delegates, however, shortly after the release of the third
version of the Declaration the tide of war had changed for the worse which meant that the
possibility of now reaching a negotiated settlement as the result of the Continental Army’s early
position of strength, had quickly become remote. Beginning with the Battle of Bound Brook on
April 13, 1777, of the 39 engagements that were fought between the colonial victories at
Trenton and Princeton and when the French military first entered the war (September, 1778),
only 10 battles were won by the Americans while the British had won 29 which meant that the
British were no longer in a position of weakness.
It goes without saying that If the end of the war had favored the British, the signers of the
Goddard version of the Declaration, whose names were now well known, could very well have
been charged with treason. Despite this possibility though, all was not necessarily lost, at least
in the minds of the delegates who had agreed on January 18, 1777, to sign this version of the
Declaration. On June 20, 1776, which was well before the release date for this third version,
British Vice-Admiral Richard Howe had issued a statement that offered amnesty to any
American who agreed that he would not participate in any further rebellious activities against
the Crown. His brother, General Howe, on November 30, 1776, extended the same offer to
those who would agree to “remain in peaceful obedience to his Majesty…(and) In the fall of
1776, many people of New Jersey accepted the terms that the Howe brothers offered them.”
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Within a few weeks, British authorities reported that more than three thousand people had
come forward to make an oath of allegiance to George III and take their ‘protection papers’. 25
Of central importance to the current report, Richard Stockton, one of the Declaration’s early
signers and “high on the list of the Americans the British sought to capture,” was arrested and
imprisoned on November 3, 1776. On December 29, 1776, Stockton also took advantage of
this offer, initialed the required statement, and was set free. “Had he not signed the Amnesty
statement he would have remained in prison with the liability of being ‘hanged , drawn and
quartered,’ as well as losing all of his property, thus impoverishing his family.”26 The critical
point here is that those whose printed names appeared on this third widely circulated version
of the Declaration would have known about the Howe brothers’ offer and could have allowed
their names to be released in January 1777 with full knowledge that if worse came to worse
they too would have been able to avoid a charge of treason by taking the same oath before the
war ended.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing evidence It seems reasonable to draw the following conclusions. The
first version of the Declaration, intended principally for domestic consumption, was used as a
recruiting tool for the colonial military rather than as a “war document,” and if those who are
said to have signed it on July 4, only signed the printer’s proof, not the circulated copy, they
were probably not concerned about being charged with treason. The second version, which did
contain their names, was only available on a single parchment copy that was carefully
protected and hidden throughout the war. This version, too, probably would not have
generated any fear of bringing charges of treason because, in all likelihood, it would have been
destroyed if subsequent events suggested that the war was about to be lost. Finally, the third
version, though widely circulated and with all but one of the delegates names, was released at
a time when the delegates were aware that if they subsequently signed the British offer of
amnesty, this action on their part would have negated the charges of treason. In essence
those who added their names on July 4, 1776, August 2, 1776, or even as late as January 18,
1777, probably did so in full knowledge of the fact that, regardless of when or what they
signed, the odds of being charged and convicted of treason were extremely remote. Hence,
the belief that the 56 delegates who signed the Declaration had voluntarily engaged in this act
despite the horrendous nature of the punishment that would have ensued if caught, appears to
be unfounded.
Whether or not one still wishes to view the signers as heroes, however, it must be said that
with few exceptions they were among the ablest, the brightest, the best educated, and the
most devoted citizens that America had to offer at the time. Most had attended the leading
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colleges of the day either in America or England and of the 56 signers, following the revolution,
two became Presidents of the United States, two others became United States Senators, and 14
were state governors. During the early stages of the revolution many took part in committees
to draft the Articles of Confederation as well as templates on how to establish alliances with
other counties both for trade and to seek help during the war. We mention these points
because they have an important bearing on a further question regarding the signers posed by
Pauline Maier.
Why, however, was it (the Declaration) signed at all? Only John Browne, Parliament’s
clerk, signed the English Declaration of Rights. Moreover, according to Lois Schwoerer,
the members of England’s seventeenth-century Parliaments did not customarily sign
instruments they presented to the King, nor were declarations and petitions signed by
their drafters elsewhere in Europe. “Of the documents comparable to the Declaration
of Rights,” she says, “only the Declaration of Independence of the American colonies
was signed by its framers.”27
As one possible answer to her question Maier noted that the Crown did not recognize the
legitimacy of Congress. By signing this document, the delegates signified that each of the
colonies they represented were in support of the terms contained within the document. “This
was, they seemed to say, not the work of an inconsequential faction of colonists, as their critics
in England so often alleged, but the voice of the American people and of the men of
consequence they selected to speak for them.”28
While Maier’s answer certainly could be correct, there is also another way to address this
matter. In line with a point raised above (see page 6), consider for the moment that the
Declaration might not have been intended solely for use as either a war document or a
recruiting tool but, instead, as a legally crafted instrument issued collectively by thirteen
sovereign nations (as the term “United States” implies) to bring about a negotiated end to an
impending war.29 We raise this possibility because within the body of the Declaration were the
grievances the Crown had been asked to rectify and that served as justification for the
concluding section which contained the words by Richard Henry Lee (see page 3) as grounds for
achieving a solution to end the hostilities.
Following its ratification the 56 members of Congress who signed the Declaration would now be
empowered to serve as duly elected bargaining agents or representatives of the United States
(“We…the Representatives of the United States of America”). Since 25 of the 56 members were
lawyers, given their legal training they would have been well aware of the need for signatures
because it was common practice at the time for sovereign nations to add the signatures of
those charged with negotiating contractual arrangements to the bottom of all relevant
documents.30 The earliest example of this use of signatures by one of the colonies is the Treaty
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of Watertown, the purpose of which was to create a negotiated contractual arrangement
between the State of Massachusetts Bay and several Indian bands for the purpose of
establishing a military alliance. On July 19, 1776, which was very shortly after the Declaration
was ratified, the Treaty was signed by the 17 Governors of the State of Massachusetts Bay.31
Although Britain did not agree with the colonies self-proclaimed designation as a series of
“sovereign nations,” Britain apparently did agree with this proposed use of the Declaration. In
March 1778 Parliament authorized the Carlisle Peace Commission to grant the colonies a
number of concessions designed to end the war, many of which stemmed directly or indirectly
from the grievances in the Declaration.32 According to Weldon Brown’s 1941 summary of the
Peace Commission’s mandate,
England proposed a restoration of conditions existing prior to 1763… (and) there was to
be a relaxation of the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy. The colonists
were to have a greater share in their government, such as the popular election of
governors, and their own customs officials…The colonies could have a representation in
Parliament, and Parliament would recognize the priority of Congress over American
affairs…Standing armies in America in peace time could be discarded if the colonies
would supply their own troops. Changes in provincial governments and charters were
not to be made except by popular consent…(and there was to be ) colonial freedom
from parliamentary taxation… 33
There is little doubt, based on Brown’s summary, that the concessions offered by the Peace
Commission represented a major shift in how much Britain was willing to sacrifice in order to
reconcile the differences between the two countries in an effort to end the war and keep the
American colonies within the British fold. In fact, Brown even concluded that “The recognition
of Congress was a virtual renunciation of the legislative supremacy of Parliament over the
internal affairs of the colonies. These instructions (to the Commission) showed that England
was at last awaking to the fact that America was a nation, strong and powerful. Beyond the
possibility of British subjection.”34 In 2005 David Wilson further concluded that when the
Commission arrived in America it was “empowered by the British king to give Congress nearly
anything it wanted to end the rebellion.”35
Despite the promise that the Commission’s mandate held for reconciliation, the Commission’s
goal was doomed from the start. Owing largely to the victory that the continental army had
achieved at Saratoga on October 7, 1777, coupled with an agreement that France would
provide military assistance to aid the colonies in their war with Britain, even before the
Commission arrived in America in June, 1778, their offerings were viewed with contempt by the
delegates. In a rebuke to a draft of the bill received from General Howe concerning the goal of
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the Commissioners, which was “to treat, consult, and agree upon Means of quieting the
disorders in the Colonies,”36 Congress resolved on April 22, 1778, that
…these United States cannot with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with any
commissions on the part of Great Britain, unless they shall, as a preliminary thereto,
either withdraw their fleets and armies, or else, in positive and express terms,
acknowledge the independence of said states.37
In essence, the delegates were so convinced that America would now win the war there was no
need to accept or even consider the Commission’s offerings and so on June 17, 1778, which was
when the final unanimous Congressional decision was reached,38 the war was allowed to
continue until five years later when the Paris Peace Treaty, which finally ended the war, was
signed on September 3, 1783.

Epilogue
Before we leave this last topic, and in line with remarks by Anthony Gregory, it is worth asking
whether the Congressional decision to reject the Commission’s offerings was indeed
“unanimous” as stated above. In a 2018 review of the workings of the Carlisle Peace
Commission, Gregory drew attention to this point when he noted that none of the historians
who had thus far evaluated the outcome of the Commission’s efforts “scrutinized the
Congress’s confident claims of unanimity.”39 While not among the reasons given by Gregory for
raising his concern, our concern with the word “unanimous,” when used in this especially
critical context, strongly suggests that the Continental Congress as a whole must have been in
agreement when the decision was reached to reject the Commission’s offerings. Unfortunately,
this was not the case. Of the 80 elected delegates who were eligible to cast a vote during the
1778 Congressional meetings, only 31 were in attendance when the final vote was tallied on
June 17.40 The Congressional record for that date also shows that in the case of North Carolina
none of its five elected representatives were present and in five of the other states the
numbers in attendance were substantially lower than the numbers elected. In Connecticut
whereas eight were elected only three attended, in Maryland eight were also elected but only
two were present, while in Georgia one attended whereas five were elected, and in New Jersey
as well as in Pennsylvania nine were elected in both states, yet of these 18 delegates only five
were available to cast a vote.
The question these attendance figures raise, of course, is whether the views held by such
relatively small numbers were truly representative of the views held by the much larger body
charged with making decisions on behalf of the Second Continental Congress. This matter
becomes particularly important when we consider the highly suspicious attitude held by these
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31 delegates towards the Peace Commission itself as revealed in the following material that
also appeared in the Congressional minutes and was unanimously approved on June 17.
Whereas, many letters, addressed to individuals of these United States, have been
lately received from England, through the conveyance of the enemy (the Peace
Commission), and some of them, which have been under the inspection of members of
Congress, are found to contain ideas insidiously calculated to divide and delude the
good people of these states: Resolved, That it be and it is hereby earnestly
recommended to the legislative executive authorities of the several states, to exercise
the utmost care and vigilance and take the most effectual measures to put a stop to so
dangerous and criminal a correspondence.
In addition to this warning, on June 17 the 31 delegates also unanimously agreed on the
appointment of a sub-committee that consisted of three members (Richard Henry Lee, William
Henry Drayton, and Gouverneur Morris), all of whom were strongly in favor of independence
and opposed to reconciliation.41 The sole purpose of this sub-committee was to review and
censor all of the correspondence from the Commission.
In sum, our concern with the word “unanimous,” which stems from both the numerical
evidence and the attendance records cited above along with these two further points, is how
open minded to reconciliation were these 31 representatives in relation to the 80 delegates as
a whole? While it is not possible to know the views of the main body of the 1778 delegation,
when the delegation that met in 1775-1776 to decide on the issue of independence versus
reconciliation, these two opposing positions were debated at considerable length on the floor
of Congress. The following comment by York offers a sense of the uncertainty that had existed
among a very large number over the two conflicting political ideologies.
Through the fall of 1775, for every John Adams wanting independence there were
probably two other patriots wanting reconciliation. There continued to be, as Adams
observed, “a Strange Oscillation between Love and Hatred, between War and Peace.”
Thus the messages from leaders in New York and New Jersey, as well as from
Pennsylvania and Maryland, urging Congress not to do anything precipitate, anything
that could frustrate their desire to reunify the empire.42
As a concrete illustration of this Congressional rancor, even though the colonies had voted to
ratify the Declaration on July 2, 1776, as recently as one day before the vote was taken, not all
of the colonies or the delegates chosen to represent the colonies necessarily favored the
message of independence contained within the document. On July 1 a “Committee of the
Whole took a vote and found that only nine of the thirteen colonies were ready to support
independence, with Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, split and the delegates from New
12

York still without official authorization to vote for independence.”43 In terms of the delegates
themselves, although 88 were authorized to attend the Second Continental Congress in 177576, and 34 might have signed the printer’s proof on July 4, 22 others waited until August 2 or
later to sign, and the remaining delegates did not sign at all.
While the reasons for delaying or failing to sign are not known for every delegate, Carter
Braxton, one of the delegates who had delayed until August 2, mentioned several reasons that
were given by many of his peers.44 One reason centered on the fear that once independence
from Britain was achieved, civil wars could erupt among several of the colonies over long
simmering border disputes. For instance, the border dispute between Connecticut and
Pennsylvania, which dated back to the charter of 1662 and erupted in gunfire in the 1770s, was
not resolved until 1783 when “All local Pennsylvania officials in the formally contested area
were ordered to protect Connecticut people in the Wyoming Valley, and Pennsylvania settlers
were warned not to molest them.”45 A second reason stemmed from an equally longstanding
desire on the part of many to actually achieve reconciliation. As long as the colonies delayed
their endorsement of separation, the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement of the
differences that existed between the colonies and Great Britain could continue to be explored.
Once independence was declared, however, that possibility would no longer exist. Strangely
enough, Thomas Jefferson was among those who initially had hoped for reconciliation. Seven
months after the battles of Lexington and Concord he wrote “There is not in the British Empire
a man who more cordially loves a union with Great Britain than I do.” Following his assessment
of the grievances, however, he was “saddened that he could no longer live in what he deemed
an unjust empire.”46
We mention these points because if a more representative body of delegates had been present
on June 17, 1778, and if their views had resembled the views of those who met in 1775-76, the
Commission’s offerings might not have been rejected and the war could have ended five years
earlier and avoided “a great waste of blood and treasure.”
Most students of the war believe that about thirty thousand who served in the
Continental army perished while on duty, a percentage roughly equal to the total of
regulars in the Civil War and nearly ten times greater than among those whose soldiered
for the United States in World War II. If these conservative estimates are correct, about
one in sixteen American males died in the Revolutionary War, compared with one in ten
in the Civil War, and one in seventy-five in World War II…(In terms of Britain and her
allies) one-quarter of all British and German soldiers deployed in North America roughly ten thousand redcoats and seventy-five hundred mercenaries died there…Taken
as a whole, in excess of fifty thousand who served Great Britain died and more than
twenty thousand Frenchmen died. Spanish died too, so that ultimately close to one
13

hundred thousand who served in British and European armies lost their lives in this
widespread conflagration.47
An early end to the war also would have greatly attenuated the financial burden that the
colonies were subsequently forced to endure. According to material provided by the Avalon
Project at the Yale Law School, although France was certainly an essential ally, it did not offer its
military assistance merely as a gracious gesture. At the end of the war France sent an invoice to
Congress for all of the military expenses that it had incurred between 1778 and 1782 which
totaled approximately 18,000,000 pounds “with interest at five percent per annum…” Although
this one debt was finally settled in 1795, it is said that the overall cost of the Revolutionary War
was around 165,000, 000 pounds which led to what Smith48 referred to as a “downward dollar
plunge and near bankruptcy” for the newly established American Republic. 49
While there is no way of knowing how long the American colonies would have remained within
the British fold if the Peace Commission’s offerings had not been rejected, given the
seriousness of the issue at hand, It would seem reasonable to ask why no attempt was made to
delay the vote to provide more time for additional delegates to attend, or for those already in
attendance to consult with their colleagues at home before the final decision was rendered. In
1775-76, Congress delayed the vote on the Declaration itself for approximately three weeks
(see page 3 above) to provide ample time for the delegates to decide how best to proceed. We
examined the minutes of all 46 sessions held by the Continental Congress between April 22 and
June 17, 1778, and found no mention of any comparable motion before the final vote was
rendered on June 17.
Finally, and despite these considerations it must also be acknowledged that even if all of the
elected delegates had been present in 1778 and a more balanced approach to the matter had
been taken, it still might have been difficult for the United States to have negotiated a peaceful
settlement with Great Britain. The reason here being that on February 6, 1778, which was well
before the Peace Commission arrived, the United States and France had already signed a
military agreement known as the Treaty of Alliance. Among the many items listed in the
treaty, Article 8 contained the following provision: “Neither of the two parties shall conclude
either a truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first
obtained…”50 Hence, for the United States to have accepted the Peace Commission’s offerings,
it would have been necessary for France also to have agreed with their decision. Because
France was an avowed enemy of Great Britain such an agreement would have been extremely
difficult to obtain and, without such an agreement, this potential treaty with Great Britain could
not have been ratified. Of equal importance, and as a further function of the Treaty of
Alliance, a fleet of armed French ships had arrived off the coast of North America on July 8 and
was heading to New York.51 Needless say, preparations for such a lengthy voyage also must
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have taken place long before June 17, which by itself suggests that both France and the United
States were already on their way to war with Britain long before the Peace Commission arrived.
Thus, although we certainly agree with the importance of Gregory’s concern over the
meaningfulness of the term “unanimous,” it would appear from the above evidence coupled
with this brief overview of the Treaty of Alliance, that beyond the motivational reasons given by
Gregory for Congress’s dismissal of the Peace Commission’s offerings, a careful examination of
the entire rationale behind the decision on June 17 could prove to be far more complex than
previously thought.
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14Both

the Sugar Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1764, and the Stamp Act, passed in
1765, were repealed or revised largely as the result of protests that had taken place throughout
the colonies. The same was true for three of the four grievances that stemmed from the
Townshend Act, passed in 1767, and in reaction to the grievances associated with the
Quartering Act of 1765, New York had refused to provide food and lodging to the British troops
and no immediate reprisals were forthcoming (Faulkner, 1957, p. 101-103, Hinderker, 2017, p.
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98). As an aid to the reader, the following summaries contain the main provisions in these as
well as in several other Acts that also gave rise to the grievances in the Declaration.
The Sugar Act
Although this act imposed tariffs not only on sugar, but also on coffee, wine and many other
products imported into the colonies, it was particularly disruptive to the colonists’ trade with
the West Indies because of the duty or tax it enacted on sugar brought into the colonies from
the French West Indies.
Despite the harm that this tax produced on the colonies, its main purpose was to promote the
business interests of the sugar colonies in the British West Indies. To insure that all of the
duties were collected and that purchases were confined to the British West Indies sugar
colonies, “the act provided heavy penalties for all shippers, British and American alike, who
tried to smuggle goods contrary to the terms of the law” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 101).
The Stamp Act
The terms of this act required the colonists to purchase and place stamps on all printed matter
such as deeds, mortgages, colleges diplomas, and licenses to practice law. Stamps were also
needed for playing cards, dice, almanacs, and calendars. The costs of the stamps, which ranged
from a few pence to several pounds, affected not only the livelihood of merchants, lawyers,
publishers and writers, but also the average consumer through the products they purchased.
Although not a direct tax, as was the case with the Sugar Act, “If the British Parliament had
deliberately searched for taxes that would annoy as many Americans as possible, it could
scarcely have improved upon the Stamp Act” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 102). As an illustration of
the level of this annoyance, in August 1765 crowds in Boston burned effigies and destroyed the
homes of the stamp distributor and the Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor (Wheeler and
Becker, 2002, p. 77).
The Townshend Act
The Townshend Act also known as the Revenue Act imposed duties on the import of glass,
lead, paper, and painters’ colors. To collect the duties, the Act “gave the higher courts in the
colonies, made up of British judges, power to issue Writs of Assistance, authorizing customs
officers to search houses, warehouses, shops, cellars, and other places for smuggled goods and
to seize them summarily if found” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 104).
In 1770, owing to protests from the colonists, all of the components in this act were repealed
with one exception: tea. That component was then supplemented in 1773 by an additional act,
the purpose of which was to relieve the British East India Company of the necessity of having to
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pay duties on tea exported to the colonies. Although at first glance this move by Parliament
would appear to have been favorable to the colonists, it is important to understand its history
and its rationale, as interpreted by the colonists.
The British East India Company held a monopoly on all trade between India and the rest
of the empire. This monopoly had yielded fabulous returns, but decades of corruption
and inefficiency together with heavy military expenses in recent years had weakened
the company until it was almost bankrupt.
Among the assets of this venerable institution were some 17 million pounds of tea
stored in English warehouses. Normally, East India Company tea was sold to English
wholesalers. They in turn sold it to American wholesalers, who distributed it to local
merchants for sale to the consumer. A substantial British tax was levied on the tea as
well as the three penny Townshend duty. Now Lord North, the new prime minister,
decided to remit the British tax and to allow the company to sell (the tea) directly in
America through its own agents. The savings would permit a sharp reduction of the
retail price and at the same time yield a nice profit to the company (Garrraty &
McCaughey, 1989, p. 65).
Because of this move by Parliament the cost of East India tea would become lower than the
cost of tea provided by many of the other companies that also served the colonists. The net
effect of the move, however, was to force the closure of these other companies and thereby
enable the East India Company to achieve a monopoly in the sale of its tea to the colonists.
This action was seen by the colonists as “a step toward setting up British monopolies for the
control of all American foreign and domestic trade” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 105). The public
outrage was such that
little groups of patriots that had had been formed in each town during the past three
years to exchange revolutionary sentiments and unite colonial protests – swung into
action, determined that the obnoxious beverage should never be landed. When the
ships arrived these groups were ready. At New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston the
captains were forced to turn back or store the cargo in warehouses (Billington,
Loewenberg, and Brockunier, 1947, p. 53).
The only exception was Boston where the tea ship Dartmouth arrived on November 17, 1773,
and was allowed to unload by order of the colony’s British appointed Governor. Approximately
one month later the tea chests on board were thrown into the harbour by a band of colonists
which gave rise to what has become known as the “Boston Tea Party.” Arguably the most
significant outcome of the Tea Party for the colonists was the passage in Parliament of The
Coercive Acts in 1774. Aside from transferring the capital of the Massachusetts Bay colony
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along with the custom house from Boston to Salem, it “closed the port of Boston to all
commercial navigation until the tea, valued at around eighteen thousand pounds, should be
paid for” (Faulkner, 1957, p. 110).
The Quartering Act
This act required the colonies to cover the cost of room and board for all the British soldiers
sent to the colonies following the end of the seven year war between Britain and France.
Although many, but not all, of the colonies had agree to this requirement during the war, now
that the war was over, the colonies saw no reason to cover the costs of housing a standing
army during peacetime.
Standing armies had been anathema to Englishmen since at least the early seventeenth
century, and even in the mid-eighteenth century opposition to them remained an article
of faith for many traditionally minded critics. They regarded peacetime armies as
expensive and unnecessary; more important, they considered them to be an
indispensable support of arbitrary government. Standing armies, they believed,
threatened popular liberties wherever they appeared and were the tools of ambitious
kings who sought to expand royal prerogatives at the expense of the people
(Hinderaker, 2017, p. 81).
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29As

evidence that the 13 colonies considered themselves “sovereign nations,” the Continental
Congress established a committee to develop protocols consistent with those used by other
sovereign nations “upon the reception of foreign Ministers.” The following protocol was under
consideration in July, 1778, to be used in the case of a visiting foreign ambassador.
When he shall arrive within any of the United States he shall receive from any battery,
fort or castle the same salute or honors paid to the Flag of the Prince or State which he
shall represent…When the ambassador is arrived at the door of the Congress Chamber
the member who presents him shall announce him to the President (of the Congress)
and they shall bow to each other. The President shall then announce him to the whole
house, who shall bow to him and he to them. He and the President shall then again bow
to each other, and be seated; after which the members shall sit down. The President
shall be seated on a chair raised upon a stage two feet above the ground, and the
ambassador on a chair directly opposite to him, and raised eighteen inches. The
ambassador shall then sitting in his chair speak to the President and receive an answer,
after which the ambassador, the President and the whole house, shall again rise, and
the ambassador shall retire in the manner in which he was introduced, not bowing or
being bowed unto. The same persons shall wait on him upon this return who went to
bring him to the house. His title shall be Excellency. (JCC, vol. 11, p. 698-699)
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Jenkinson, 1785, for examples of similar documents with signatures issued in the 18th
century by Great Britain to achieve contractual agreements with other countries.
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Historical Society, 1869-1916, Vol 24, p. 189-195. As an interesting aside, it might not
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the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled…shall enter into any conference,
agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or state…”
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had been well aware of these grievances long before March 1788. Even though the
first version of the Declaration (the Dunlap Broadside) was not intended for wide-spread
distribution, four copies had been sent to England by British representatives in the colonies and
19
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the Hudson Bay Company preserve. Of major concern to the colonists Britain wished to
reserve all of this newly acquired land solely for the settlement of the Indian bands that had
previously resided there. Thus, all colonists who had already settled on this land as part of a
growing western movement, were commanded by Britain to “forthwith remove themselves
from such settlements” (Linklater, 2002, p. 47) and that “no settlers were to cross the
Appalachian divide and the purchase of Indian land was forbidden” (Garraty and McCaughey,
1989, p. 60). It was also the case that, because of this western movement, two companies had
been created to accommodate the needs of many eastern land speculators. The Ohio Company
of Associates planned to purchase 500,000 acres beyond the Ohio River, and the Loyal Land
Company organized by Peter Jefferson, Thomas’s father, planned to buy 800,000 acres in an
area that later became Kentucky (Linklater, 2002, p. 50). While both companies had hoped to
sell their land holdings to these western oriented pioneers, after 1763 such sales were no
longer possible. By proposing through the Carlisle Peace Commission, however, Britain was now
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an illustration of how committed William Henry Dayton was to independence over
reconciliation, the following excerpt is from a letter he sent to the Carlisle Commissioners
shortly before June 17, 1778.
America is independent de facto et de jure. She will maintain her station at the expense
of her last drop of blood…Our resolution is fixed, nor do we fear “the horrors and
devastations of war,” with which, in the conclusion of your letter, you threaten us.
France has acknowledged our independence; the great powers of Europe smile upon us;
we rely upon our own virtue and the favour of Heaven. If we continue firm, we shall
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